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Abstract:  The performance gap between hospital spending and outcomes is indicative of inefficient 
care delivery.  Operational failures—breakdowns in internal supply chains that prevent work from 
being completed—contribute to inefficiency by consuming 10% of nurses’ time (Hendrich et al. 
2008, Tucker 2004).  This paper seeks to identify organizational factors associated with operational 
failures, with a goal of providing insight into effective strategies for removal. We observed nurses on 
medical/ surgical units at two hospitals, shadowed support staff who provided materials, and 
interviewed employees about their internal supply chain’s performance.  These activities created a 
database of 120 operational failures and the organizational factors that contributed to them.  We 
found that employees believed their department’s performance was satisfactory, but poorly trained 
employees in other departments caused the failures. However, only 14% of the operational failures 
arose from errors or training.  They stemmed instead from multiple organizationally-driven factors: 
insufficient workspace (29%), poor process design (23%), and a lack of integration in the internal 
supply chains (23%).  Our findings thus suggest that employees are unlikely to discern the role that 
their department’s routines play in operational failures, which hinders solution efforts.  Furthermore, 
in contrast to the “Pareto Principle” which advocates addressing “large” problems that contribute a 
disproportionate share of the cumulative negative impact of problems, the failures and causes were 
dispersed over a wide range of factors.  Thus, removing failures will require deliberate cross-
functional efforts to redesign workspaces and processes so they are better integrated with patients’ 
needs.  
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1. Introduction 
Hospitals struggle to improve efficiency, quality of care, and patient experience (Berwick et al. 
2006), despite a pressing need to do so (Institute of Medicine 1999, Institute of Medicine 2001, 
Leape and Berwick 2005, Wachter 2010). Operational failures—defined as instances where an 
employee does not have the supplies, equipment, information, or people needed to complete work 
tasks—contribute to hospitals’ poor performance (Tucker 2004). They waste at least 10% of 
caregivers’ time, delay care, and contribute to safety lapses (Beaudoin and Edgar 2003, de Leval et al. 
2000, Gurses and Carayon 2007, Hall et al. 2010, Hendrich et al. 2008, Tucker 2004).  Therefore, a 
critical step in improving the performance of hospitals is identifying and addressing underlying 
causes of operational failures.  
However, research suggests that reducing operational failures may prove to be challenging.  
Operational failures manifest as minor glitches that take, on average, only three minutes to work 
around and range across many different types (e.g. missing medication, linen shortages, incorrect 
dietary trays, etc.) (Beaudoin and Edgar 2003, Fredendall et al. 2009, Gurses and Carayon 2007, 
Gurses and Carayon 2009, Hendrich et al. 2008, Sobek and Jimmerson 2003, Tucker 2004).  The 
diffusion of impact and type makes it unlikely that traditional quality improvement methods will be 
successful at preventing operational failures because these methods are designed to detect and 
address a few, large-impact problems that disproportionately contribute to poor performance—the 
so-called 20% of problems responsible for 80% of the negative impact (Juran et al. 1999).  
Furthermore, only a handful of published studies have systematically examined the causes of 
operational failures (Fredendall et al. 2009).  Thus, additional research is needed to understand what 
leads to operational failures and what hospitals can do to address the underlying causes.   
This paper seeks to increase hospital productivity and quality of care by uncovering 
organizational factors associated with operational failures so that hospitals can reduce the frequency 
with which these failures occur.  The authors, together with a team of 25 people, conducted direct 2 
 
observations of nurses on the medical/surgical wards of two hospitals, which surfaced 120 
operational failures. The team also shadowed employees from the support departments that 
provided materials, medications, and equipment needed for patient care, tracing the flow of 
materials through the organizations’ internal supply chains.  Our approach enabled us to discover 
organizational factors associated with the occurrence and persistence of operational failures.  
We used a grounded, inductive reasoning approach, which examines a research question through 
iterative cycles of analyzing data to allow patterns to emerge from observations (Miles and 
Huberman 1994).  We compared what we learned to existing theory to determine which ones best 
reflected the underlying dynamics (Shah et al. 2008).  Our methods resembled those of other 
operations management scholars who conducted qualitative, interview and observation-based  
investigations of healthcare organizations to discover drivers of productivity (Fredendall et al. 2009, 
Ghosh and Sobek 2006, Jimmerson et al. 2005, Shah et al. 2008, Sobek and Jimmerson 2003).   
We contribute to the body of knowledge on process improvement in hospitals by providing 
insights about potential strategies for preventing operational failures. In contrast to workers’ beliefs 
that operational failures arose from other people’s mistakes or lack of training, we found that 
violations of Toyota’s four rules of effective work design (Spear and Bowen 1999) explained many 
of the operational failures that we observed. This finding implies that attention to work design 
should reduce operational failures in hospitals (Fredendall et al. 2009, Ghosh and Sobek 2006, Sobek 
and Jimmerson 2003).  In addition to work design flaws, low levels of internal and external 
integration also contributed to operational failures. Most prior operations management research on 
integration has examined its impact on organizational performance, such as the speed of new 
product development (Flynn et al. 2010), financial performance (Dröge et al. 2004), and processing 
time (Shah et al. 2008), but did not specify mechanisms through which integration leads to better 
performance. Our study makes a contribution by developing propositions that low levels of internal 
integration among upstream supply departments contributed to operational failures experienced by 3 
 
downstream frontline staff, thus negatively impacting performance outcomes, such as quality, 
timeliness, and efficiency.   
2. Prior Research on Operational Failures and Lean Manufacturing Work Design 
Many researchers have documented the existence of operational problems that impede efficient 
completion of work tasks.  These have been referred to as glitches (Uhlig et al. 2002), operational 
failures (Tucker 2004, Tucker and Spear 2006), performance obstacles (Gurses and Carayon 2007), 
hassles (Beaudoin and Edgar 2003), blockages (Rathert et al. 2012), and situational constraints 
(Peters and O'Connor 1980, Villanova and Roman 1993). In this paper, we refer to them as 
operational failures. Operational failures occur in everyday work, particularly when the work is 
complex and requires inputs from more than one department within the organization, as is typical in 
healthcare (Beaudoin and Edgar 2003, Gurses and Carayon 2007, Hendrich et al. 2008, Tucker 
2004).  Categories of operational failures include those related to information, tools and equipment, 
materials and supplies, budgetary support, help from others, and aspects of the work environment 
such as lighting (Gilboa et al. 2008, Klein and Kim 1998, McNeese-Smith 2001, Peters and 
O'Connor 1980, Peters et al. 1985, Villanova 1996). 
A common response to operational failures is to work around them (Halbesleben et al. 2008, 
Kobayashi et al. 2005, Rathert et al. 2012, Spear and Schmidhofer 2005). Halbesleben et al. (2010) 
define a workaround as “a situation in which an employee devises an alternate work procedure to 
address a block in the flow of his or her work” (p.1). An operational failure takes an average of only 
three minutes to work around; however, nurses experience these failures repeatedly throughout their 
shift, thus causing interruptions, decreasing efficiency and increasing the risk of medical error 
(Tucker 2004, Tucker and Spear 2006).  Although workarounds facilitate task completion, which is a 
positive outcome in the short term, they preclude the additional effort to remove underlying causes 
of the operational failures, which enables them to recur (Tucker and Edmondson 2003). 4 
 
  Operational failures negatively impact performance (Gilboa et al. 2008, Peters and O'Connor 
1980, Peters et al. 1985). For example, a meta-analysis of seven different kinds of work-related 
stressors found that operational failures were most strongly correlated ( -0.29) with job performance 
(Gilboa et al. 2008).  This may be because operational failures erode employee productivity through 
workarounds.  To illustrate, studies of hospital nurses have found that approximately 10% of their 
time is spent working around operational failures (Hendrich et al. 2008, Tucker 2004).  Wasted 
employee time is particularly problematic for hospitals, where nursing labor is often the  largest 
expense (Spear 2005, Tucker 2004).  Furthermore, having to continually work around operational 
failures burns out employees and contributes to turnover (Beaudoin and Edgar 2003).  Finally, 
operational failures delay care and can lead to errors that harm customers (Halbesleben et al. 2008, 
Jimmerson et al. 2005, Spear and Schmidhofer 2005).  Despite their cumulative impact, operational 
failures prove difficult to address in practice, in part because they manifest as a wide-ranging set of 
small-scale problems rather than as a single, large problem (Beaudoin and Edgar 2003, Gurses and 
Carayon 2007, Gurses and Carayon 2009, Tucker 2004).   
Our search for the organizational factors that contributed to operational failures focused on the 
physical movement of materials through the organization. More precisely, we studied the internal 
supply chains (ISC) of the hospital, which are the sets of processes that provide customer-facing 
employees with the materials, information, equipment, and human resources they need to provide 
service (Fredendall et al. 2009, Halbesleben et al. 2010, Pagell 2004, Shah and Singh 2001, Swinehart 
and Smith 2005).  In hospitals, the resources required for patient care also include medications and 
knowledge necessary to perform one’s tasks correctly.   
Figure 1 serves as an example of ISCs in hospitals. It shows the flow of information, materials, 
equipment and medication required for medication administration, as well as the employee roles 
responsible for enacting or supporting these flows. First, a physician uses a computerized system to 
order a medication for a patient. This system relays the order to the pharmacy, where a pharmacist 5 
 
dispenses the medication. A pharmacy technician may deliver the medication to the nursing unit, 
placing it in one of several possible storage locations, including a medication refrigerator.  
Alternatively, the technician may send it through a pneumatic tube system, or place it into an 
automated dispensing device on the unit. Engineering is responsible for maintaining the refrigerator 
and tube system, while IT is accountable for the automated dispensing devices, as well as the 
computers used to order medications. Nurses administer medications, which often requires them to 
first gather medication-related supplies located in various places throughout the nursing unit, such as 
syringes (which the central supply department stocks) or a pump (which is maintained by biomedical 
equipment and cleaned by the sterile processing department). In addition, the nurse may need to 
administer the medication with food, such as applesauce or ice cream, which dietary services keeps 
stocked in the unit’s kitchen for such purposes. In total, nine departments are involved in the 
medication administration ISC: medical staff, pharmacy, nursing, engineering, central supplies, 
dietary, IT, biomedical equipment, and sterile processing.  Operational failures can occur at any stage 
of the ISC and can be caused by a variety of factors including human error, delay, equipment 
malfunction, or miscommunication. When an operational failure occurs, the nurse typically only 
knows that the required medication or supply is not on the unit, but not why it is missing or where 
the ISC has broken down.   
---------- Insert Figure 1 about here ---------- 
Lean manufacturing principles provide a starting point for understanding the causes of 
operational failures. Lean is a production strategy that enables companies to efficiently produce what 
customers have ordered, in part by supplying workers with required materials and equipment in a 
timely manner (Liker and Hoseus 2010, Shah and Ward 2003, Spear and Bowen 1999, Womack and 
Jones 2003).  In particular, after conducting our analyses, we found that the categories that emerged 
from our study mapped onto Spear and Bowen’s (SB’s) (1999) four work design rules from Toyota, 
the quintessential “lean” company. Thus, we selected SB’s four design rules for activities, 6 
 
connections, pathways, and improvement as an organizing mechanism for reporting our findings. 
Furthermore, although SB’s rules originated in automobile manufacturing, they have been applied to 
hospital work (Fredendall et al. 2009, Furman and Caplan 2007, Jimmerson et al. 2005, Shannon et 
al. 2007, Spear and Schmidhofer 2005, Thompson et al. 2003, Toussaint et al. 2010, Wysocki 2004).  
Below, we briefly list the four rules, as adapted by Ghosh and Sobek (2006). 
  Activity Specification: Activities should be highly specified as to content, sequence, 
timing and outcome. 
  Connection Clarity: Connections between internal suppliers and their customers should 
be direct, with a clear yes or no request for work to be completed. 
  Pathway Simplification: The pathways through which materials travel through the 
organization should be direct, without any repeat loops or branches. 
  Improvement Oversight: Improvement should be done at the lowest organizational level 
possible and under the guidance of an experienced coach. 
 
The connection and pathway rules increase internal integration, which is defined as the degree to 
which a ﬁrm’s procedures are coordinated across functional areas to most efficiently fulﬁll customer 
requirements (Zhao et al. 2011).  High levels of integration leads to better cost, quality, and delivery 
performance (Dröge et al. 2004, Germain and Iyer 2006, Gimenez and Ventura 2005, Iansiti and 
Clark 1994, O'Leary-Kelly and Flores 2002, Stank et al. 2001).  It is particularly beneficial in 
environments characterized by high levels of uncertainty because it enables the organization to 
respond to interruptions in organizational routines (Anderson and Parker 2012, Iansiti and Clark 
1994).  Therefore, we believe that a lack of integration can contribute to failures.  Integration is 
related to, but distinct from, supply chain coordination, which is typically used to describe inventory 
ordering decisions and contracts between external suppliers and retailers (Cachon 2003). 
3. Methods 7 
 
We conducted our study at two of the hospitals operated by an integrated healthcare organization of 
36 hospitals. We selected these hospitals because they were supported by our geographically based 
grant.  Data was gathered from October to December 2011 using multiple methods, including 
surveys, direct observation, and interviews.  
We gathered multiple kinds of data to investigate the organizational factors that contributed to 
operational failures.  At the start of the project, we asked support department managers at the two 
hospitals what metrics they used to gauge their department’s performance on timeliness, quality, and 
cost. Furthermore, we evaluated the extent to which the departments’ work was driven by patient 
needs and we also gathered observational data.  Together with a larger team of 25 people, the 
authors observed nurses as they worked in medical/surgical nursing units. When they were available, 
we also observed employees in the support departments that provided the materials, medications, 
equipment, food, and general support services needed for patient care. The team conducted a total 
of 66 observations over 112 hours; 82 hours were spent observing nursing care, and 30 hours were 
spent observing support departments. Two-hour observations were conducted individually and 
consisted of shadowing participants while they did their job as well as open-ended conversations 
intended to identify the reasons behind each action. There were two observation periods per day, for 
three or four days at each hospital. Our sample consisted of a variety of professionals, including 
nurses, aides, nurse managers, charge nurses, unit assistants, pharmacists, pharmacy technicians, 
engineers, central supply technicians, biomedical engineers, and dietary and IT staff.  Study 
participants were given the option to refuse participation, although none did.   
On average, 5.7 of 25 team members were observing at a given time in the hospital.  Having 
multiple people observing at the same time enabled us to simultaneously observe multiple employees 
within the same nursing unit and in the support departments.  The individuals who helped us with 
the observations included support department managers and front-line employees, nurse managers 
from the nursing units we observed, and staff nurses.  Observers were not assigned to the hospital 8 
 
in which they worked.  The authors standardized the process by instructing observers to take notes 
on blank paper and then summarize what they had discovered using “contact summary sheets” 
(Miles and Huberman 1994).  These sheets had space to record the subject’s position, any observed 
operational failures, the causes of these failures, what actions were taken in response, and the 
number of minutes that the failure delayed care. These sheets were one of our data sources. 
After each two-hour observation block, team members gathered to make verbal reports of who 
was observed, his or her role, and the key incidents directly observed (Gilmore 2002, IDEO 2011, 
Lin et al. 2011). Verbally describing key events from all of the different observers’ perspectives 
allowed a more complete understanding of events to emerge. For example, one nurse might engage 
in behavior (e.g., tampering with a computer to make it appear broken, so that no one else would 
use it) that causes a different nurse to encounter an operational failure.  As this example illustrates, 
having a group discussion brought to light different perspectives on the same incident, providing a 
deeper understanding of the causes of operational failures.  The debrief discussions were recorded 
and transcribed, replacing real names with pseudonyms. These transcripts supplemented information 
from the contact summary sheets. 
In addition to the observations, the authors interviewed managers and staff from all nine 
departments involved in the ISC. Interviewing one or two people at a time, we asked about the 
challenges they faced, what contributed to the challenges, how departments coordinated their work, 
and how work requests were transmitted across boundaries.  These interviews were also recorded 
and transcribed. Table 1 provides details on the number of people who participated in observations 
and interviews, and the departments to which they belonged.  
---------- Insert Table 1 about here---------- 
After compiling all of the observation and interview data, the authors conducted a qualitative 
analysis.  This involved multiple iterations of collectively distilling and analyzing the information 
gathered from the observations and interviews (Miles and Huberman 1994). The operational failures 9 
 
that we directly observed the nurses encounter were recorded on the contact summary sheets and 
served as the primary data for our qualitative analysis. We used a grounded approach (Glaser and 
Strauss 1967, Miles and Huberman 1994, Strauss and Corbin 1998) to extract information from the 
debrief transcripts. To give all the authors an understanding of the operational failures, we divided 
the transcripts among us and individually extracted information.  However, we first established inter-
rater reliability by having all authors code the same transcript and comparing which sentences we 
had individually highlighted as important.  Our inter-rater reliability was .72 (kappa), which indicated 
substantial agreement (Landis and Koch 1977). This high inter-rater reliability provided confidence 
that we could divide the transcripts among us to identify and extract key passages.  We then 
summarized the main issue from each passage onto a single sticky note. This resulted in 680 notes, 
which we used for our qualitative analysis.  
Over the course of eight workdays, the authors used a structured process (“affinity diagrams”) to 
convert the extracted qualitative data contained in the 680 notes into a framework of the 
organizational factors associated with operational failures as well as the consequences of the failures 
(Shiba et al. 1993). First, we collapsed notes that had the same information (e.g. multiple occurrences 
of nurses encountering a computer with a dead battery) and placed related notes in a cluster (e.g., all 
notes related to computers).  We then created a higher-level classification of how the events related 
to each other (Glaser and Strauss 1967, Miles and Huberman 1994, Strauss and Corbin 1998).  
Figure 2 shows a photo of a grouping of sticky notes during analysis. 
---------- Insert Figure 2 about here ---------- 
After establishing an initial set of insights, we consulted the literature on operational failures.  
Post hoc, we found that our framework was similar to SB’s four rules (1999) because our identified 
organizational factors could be categorized as activities, connections, pathways, and improvement 
activities, which form the four rules (Ghosh and Sobek 2006, Sobek and Jimmerson 2003). 
Therefore, in a second analytical phase, the authors individually categorized each of the 120 10 
 
operational failures that nurses had experienced in terms of SB’s categories of activity, connection, 
pathway, or improvement.  We also created subcategories within each of the four main categories to 
provide more specific information about the operational failure.  Because research has found that 
accidents and errors result from multiple causes rather than just one (Reason 2000), we allowed 
operational failures to have multiple factors associated with their occurrence. We discussed the 
coding of each failure as a group to reach agreement on which codes to apply.  After completing this 
step, we realized that SB’s framework needed to be augmented by theory about integration in new 
product development projects and supply chains (Anderson et al. 2013, Chang Won et al. 2007, 
Flynn et al. 2010, Germain and Iyer 2006, Gimenez and Ventura 2005, Pagell 2004, Stank et al. 2001, 
Zhao et al. 2011) to fully explain our findings. As a result, our final model represents a combination 
of SB’s rules as well as factors related to internal integration.   
4. Results 
While shadowing nurses, we directly observed 120 operational failures. On average, a nurse 
experienced one failure every 37 minutes and working around them consumed 12% of their day and 
delayed care by 5.5 minutes. These findings are similar to prior research, lending credibility to our 
data (Hendrich et al. 2008, Sobek and Jimmerson 2003, Tucker 2004).   
4.1  Employees’ Responses to and Beliefs about Operational Failures 
Nurses compensated for the lack of reliability in supply by searching for functional items and 
securing them for their own use, which in turn created operational failures for other nurses.  Forty-
four percent of the nurses we interviewed complained that the equipment needed to do their job 
was often unavailable and that it was an accepted practice to “go shopping” in the dirty utility room, 
in other patients’ rooms, or on other units. One nurse said, “If you can’t find it, you go get it, no 
matter where it is.” We observed nurses violate policy by personally claiming shared equipment for 
their entire shift by putting notes (e.g. “Mary’s computer”) on computers so that other care 
providers—who also needed to use the equipment to do their jobs—would feel social pressure not 11 
 
to use these items.  More troubling, we saw nurses make functioning equipment appear broken.  For 
example, one observer saw a nurse change the computer’s settings so that the screen text was 
displayed vertically rather than horizontally to discourage other people from using “her computer”. 
A second observer’s nurse attempted to use the computer, but abandoned it due to the rotated text.  
These behaviors exacerbated equipment shortages.  
With regard to employees’ beliefs about the causes of operational failures, all employees with 
whom we spoke expressed satisfaction with their own department’s work. No one in the support 
departments believed their department’s routines needed to change to improve overall ISC 
performance. Instead, people attributed operational failures to shortcomings of workers in other 
departments. For example, a sterile processing worker attributed poor performance to a general lack 
of training, stating, “I don’t know why our organization doesn’t care about training.”  A pharmacy 
technician stated, “Nurses don’t know where medicines go.” This tendency to blame other 
departments’ employees created a significant impediment to improvement because opportunities to 
work collaboratively across boundaries to improve organizational work systems went unrecognized.  
Healthcare specifically, and people in general, tend to attribute blame to individuals rather than to 
systematic causes (Holden 2009). For example, in Gurses’ study (2009), nurses felt that supply-
related problems were caused by sloppy work by central supply technicians because they did not 
understand the importance of stocking supplies meticulously. One nurse expressed frustration with 
supply technicians. “They just kind of throw things in [the central supply storage area] that do not 
belong there. They just don’t have a grasp of why this is such a big deal.’' (pg. 514)  
 
4.2 Basic Needs  
We now describe the organizational factors associated with the operational failures that we 
observed and comment on the implications for preventing operational failures. Table 2 summarizes 
these findings. 12 
 
---------- Insert Table 2 about here ---------- 
The most frequent organizational factor associated with operational failures was not having basic 
work needs met. Examples included nurses having insufficient space or infrastructure to complete 
their work, equipment not being properly maintained, or nurses not being trained on a new policy.  
This category accounted for 29% of the causes. One of the most frequent factors was the physical 
space of the nursing unit, such as having computer workstations-on-wheels (WOWs) blocking the 
sinks where nurses needed to wash their hands.  This was because the only available electrical outlets 
to plug in the WOWs were above the sinks (11%). A second frequent cause in this category (11%) 
was broken equipment, such as bar code scanners used for medication administration that did not 
scan because a buildup accumulated on the glass surface protecting the scanning device. The 
information technology (IT) department was responsible for maintaining the scanners, but when 
interviewed, IT staff acknowledged that they did not prioritize the maintenance of bar code scanners 
because other issues, such as the electronic medical record software, were higher priority. The IT 
staff’s names, phone numbers and office locations were purposely unlisted in the hospital directory 
because they didn’t want to be interrupted by nurses’ requests for assistance. Nearly a third of the 
operational failures could have been avoided by ensuring that the physical space was sufficient for 
completing the work tasks and the equipment was properly maintained.  
4.3 Activities 
Eighteen percent of the failures stemmed from violations of SB’s activity rule.  The single largest 
cause of failures (13%) was a lack of standard procedures and methods to ensure the accuracy of an 
individual’s work activities.  This was similar to Fredendall’s finding (2009) that unstandardized 
processes resulted in missing surgical equipment.  Another activity-related issue included when 
nurses had conflicting work requests that made it unclear what was the proper action to take (3.6%), 
and a work routine that required the nurse to do a considerable amount of walking because 
necessary equipment was located far from where the work was being performed (1.7%).  13 
 
4.4 Connections 
Twelve percent of the operational failures were due to violations of SB’s connection rule. For 
example, we saw nurses use the last of a particular item without informing the internal supplier that 
the item needed to be restocked (e.g. food item, linens, medication, medical supplies). The 
subsequent nurse who tried to retrieve the item found only an empty shelf (5%). Our observations 
and interviews suggested that this dynamic existed because there was (1) no efficient or automatic 
way to re-order materials that were running low, and (2) no reliable “out of cycle” delivery process 
to bring stocked-out items to the unit, especially for dietary and material supplies. There were also 
instances where it was difficult to communicate with others (2%), most often due to a physician’s 
pager number not being listed. The cause of these operational failures was related to SB’s rule that 
there should be a clear yes or no signal that work is needed from the internal supplier.  Relatedly, 
operational failures occurred when there was no signal from the internal supplier back to the internal 
customer that the request was received or there was no information about when the material would 
be delivered.  For example, we saw nurses repeatedly follow up to check whether a requested 
material had been delivered, causing interruptions for both the nurse and the supplying department, 
such as pharmacy (5%).  Sobek and Jimmerson’s (2003) study of a hospital pharmacy observed that 
this dynamic was the primary driver of interruptions to pharmacists’ work. Finally, interruptions 
occurred when there was no way to “store” a request for help so that the person could attend to the 
help request after finishing the current task. To illustrate, twice we observed a nurse interrupt 
another nurse who was administering medications and, by hospital policy, was wearing a reflective 
vest which signaled that she was not to be interrupted.  However, the policy does not include a 
method for placing a request for help—such as a message board or a cell phone text message—
which could then wait in queue until the nurse finished with medication administration.   
 4.5 Pathways 14 
 
Violations of SB’s (1999) pathway rule accounted for 6% of the causes. For example, many 
medications, materials and equipment did not have a single, designated storage location, forcing 
nurses to look in multiple places before finding what they needed.  One nurse commented, “We 
have two Pyxis® (automated dispensing devices for medications) machines on the unit. But 
sometimes the medicine is only in one of them. So if you open this machine, and the medicine is not 
here, you have to go to the other one.  You end up taking two medications from this Pyxis and two 
other medications from the other.  But then you have to sign in twice, which drives you crazy.”   
4.6 Integration 
Nearly one fourth of the causes of failures were related to low levels of internal integration in 
the hospitals’ ISCs (23%).  These issues were not explicitly addressed in SB’s rules-in-use, 
suggesting—as other scholars have found—that the rules are insufficient for fully preventing 
operational failures in hospitals (Ghosh and Sobek 2006). We define internal integration as the 
extent to which separate departments within an organization work together to efficiently meet end-
customers’ needs (Kahn and Mentzer 1998, O'Leary-Kelly and Flores 2002, Pagell 2004). We argue 
that high levels of internal integration were required to prevent operational failures due to distinctive 
features of medical/surgical nursing units, which resulted in uncertainty in the supplies needed for 
patient care.  Large variability in the range of patient conditions treated on medical/surgical units 
and changes in individual patients’ conditions over time meant that a wide variety of materials and 
equipment were needed on the nursing units. In addition, highly technical and specialized knowledge 
was required for the supply of equipment, materials, and services involved with patient care.  As a 
result, as Figure 1 showed, nurses interacted with several disparate knowledge communities, 
increasing the possibility of a breakdown across these boundaries.  Literature on integration in new 
product development and supply chains has shown that integration is most helpful under these 
conditions, which are characterized by high levels of uncertainty and the need for coordination 
across different knowledge disciplines (Anderson and Parker 2012).  15 
 
In our study, three types of internal integration issues led to operational failures. Thus, hospitals 
could reduce operational failures by increasing integration along these dimensions. First, operational 
failures arose when supply departments’ activities were not executed in response to specific needs of 
current patients (6%).  As a result, materials or equipment on the nursing unit did not always match 
what patients needed, prompting the nurses to “go on an expedition” to find the required item. 
Thus, in our setting, which was characterized by high levels of uncertainty and variability in the 
required supplies, compliance with the activity rule that work be highly specified was insufficient to 
prevent operational failures.  Instead, suppliers’ work activities needed to be triggered by a work 
request on behalf of a specific patient.  This source of operational failures is therefore a combination 
of SB’s activity and connection rules. The work of the sterile processing department provides an 
example.  This type of operational failure also occurred with pharmaceuticals and food items. 
Nurses put used intravenous pumps in the dirty utility room, which were subsequently cleaned by 
the sterile processing department and returned to the clean utility room. Though the cleaning and 
restocking was performed correctly (in accordance to SB’s activity rule), this work did not always 
meet the needs of current patients because it was driven by discharged patients’ cessation of pumps 
rather than by the needs of current patients.  We observed that a patient needed a specific type of 
pump (a triple pump), but this pump was unavailable in the clean (or dirty) utility rooms.  The nurse 
had to search in multiple patients’ rooms before finding a dirty triple pump that she had to clean. 
This example illustrated the lack of a planning and control mechanism to connect the current 
patients’ pump needs with the work of the sterile processing department.  Thus, we observed that 
without high levels of internal integration, nurses experienced frequent operational failures because 
they were at the interface between having to provide customized care to patients and being supplied 
by “supply-to-stock” ancillary support services, such as biomedical engineering and central supply. 
A second internal integration-related cause of operational failures was insufficient knowledge 
transfer between internal suppliers and internal customers. Although the customer-supplier 16 
 
connection was specified, direct, and included a yes/no signal for communication as per SB’s 
connection rule, there were instances when the internal customer lacked enough knowledge to 
process the material efficiently (8%).  For example, we observed a nurse search unsuccessfully for 
over an hour for two bags of IV medication that she needed for her patient, despite the fact the 
pharmacy had confirmed delivery and— in accordance with SB’s pathway rule—the bags were in the 
appropriate, designated location. However, an operational failure still occurred because the nurse did 
not realize that, due to the amount of a certain type of medication in the bags, they were placed in 
the medication refrigerator—the one place out of eight possible storage locations where the nurse 
had not looked.  Research on new product development has found that essential knowledge is often 
inadvertently not transferred across discipline boundaries, because it is so central to one discipline’s 
work that that person does not realize that their counterpart in the other discipline does not possess 
it (Carlile 2002, Carlile 2004, Kellogg et al. 2006, Malone and Crowston 1990, Orlikowski 2002). Our 
example is similar to Sobek and Jimmerson’s (2003) study of a hospital pharmacy, which found that 
nurses frequently thought that refrigerated medications were “missing” because they were not with 
the patient’s other, non-refrigerated medications. As a solution to this problem the pharmacy began 
placing an index card with the words “refrigerated medication” on it with the non-refrigerated 
medications as a signal to the nurse to look in the medication refrigerator. 
The integration literature also discusses the importance of providing cross-departmental visibility 
to information contained in IT systems (Chang Won et al. 2007). We found that IT-compatibility 
issues prevented efficient connections between nursing and the laboratory (1%). Even though an 
order for a laboratory test was in the main computer system, the nurse had to call the laboratory to 
inform them of the test because the lab’s IT system was unconnected to the main system. 
The third type of internal integration-related driver of operational failures involved poor handoff 
of materials between departments.  Although pathways were direct and specified as required by SB 
(1999), in some situations, materials and equipment stalled between processing steps, which we call 17 
 
“process gaps” (8%). This happened when multiple departments could be responsible for processing 
the material, with the specific department being dictated by the particular circumstances. One 
example was the cleaning and maintenance of vital sign monitors, a responsibility shared across 
nursing, biomedical engineering, and the sterile processing department.  Another example was the 
maintenance of computers and medication bar code scanners, which involved nursing, engineering, 
and IT. Equipment remained nonfunctional as a result of these process gaps because each 
department assumed that the equipment was going to be taken care of by the other department, 
when in fact no one was working to fix it. 
4.7 Detecting Poor Performance of ISCs and Improving Performance 
SB’s improvement rule implies that improvement activities exist, but that they are not as 
effective as they could be if they were conducted by frontline employees using scientific methods, 
such as plan-do-check-act cycles.  Our qualitative data found instead that improvement efforts 
related to operational failures were non-existent, even for frequent, repetitive operational failures.  
The lack of improvement effort enabled failures to persist.  
The first cause in this category was that there were few hospital-level measures to expose failures 
in the internal supply chains (5%).  One nurse described how late medications for newly admitted 
patients resulted from processes that involved multiple departments, but despite the systemic nature 
of these failures, the involved departments did not take responsibility for changing the process. 
“Imagine that a new patient doesn’t arrive on our floor from the emergency department until 3:45 
pm.  At 3:00 pm, his physician had written an order for antibiotics to “start now.”  The medication 
is considered late if it is given more than 30 minutes after the administration time. So the medication 
is already late before he even arrives on the floor. The medication becomes even later because 
pharmacy can’t “see” the order in the IT system until the patient arrives on the floor because that is 
the earliest his nurse can “release” it to the pharmacy.  At that point, pharmacy has to verify the 18 
 
order to make sure there aren’t any interactions, and if it is an IV medication, they have to mix it 
before the technician can bring it to the nursing unit.  I wish pharmacy would try to fix this.”   
We believe the lack of effort on the part of pharmacy was due in part because there were no 
ISC-level measures that held them accountable for the poor performance of the hospital-wide 
medication administration process. To provide more information about the role of measures, we 
asked managers about the metrics they used to evaluate their department’s performance.  As Table 
3 shows, the majority focused on department-level rather than hospital-level performance. For 
example, the pharmacy’s metric for timeliness was the average time it took them to verify an order, 
which was just one piece of the entire medication administration process. Department-level metrics 
made it possible for departments to be satisfied with their performance even if their processes were 
contributing to poor hospital-level performance.  The hospitals also did not use tools that 
illuminated problems with the flow of materials through the organization, such as the supplier-
inputs-process-outputs-customers (SIPOC) tool in six-sigma (Anil et al. 2004).   
---------- Insert Table 3 about here ---------- 
In addition, there were few opportunities for employees from different departments to come 
together to discuss long-standing inefficiencies and problems and work on solutions (7%).  
Specifically, there were no regularly scheduled meetings between pharmacy, laboratory, biomedical, 
sterile processing, IT, and the nursing units.  
5. Propositions for Future Research  
Drawing on our findings, we created a model, shown in Figure 3, which depicts the drivers of 
operational failures in hospitals and provides a set of propositions for future research.   
---------- Insert Figure 3 about here ---------- 
We propose that hospitals with fewer operational failures will achieve better performance along 
dimensions such as quality of care, timeliness of care, patient satisfaction, and length of stay 
(proposition 1). However, employees can compensate for poor ISC performance by creating stashes 19 
 
of materials or equipment.  Thus, we propose that the relationship between operational failures and 
performance will be moderated by the amount of inventory on hand, either in inventory stores or in 
unofficial, “workaround” stashes held by the service department employees (proposition 2). 
We also propose that there will be fewer operational failures when organizations address the 
factors described in Section 4.  Proposition 3 states that the more employees’ basic work needs are 
met, such as having sufficient space to do one’s work and regularly maintained equipment, the fewer 
the operational failures. Adhering to SB’s rules, such as having highly specified activities, clear 
connections between internal suppliers and customers, and simplified pathways will also reduce 
operational failures (proposition 4). Sobek and colleagues have shown that application of SB’s rules 
results in process improvement in hospitals (Ghosh and Sobek 2006, Jimmerson et al. 2005).   
Increasing integration among the departments in the internal supply chain will reduce 
operational failures (proposition 5).  This can be accomplished by ensuring that support 
departments’ work is triggered by specific needs of patients.  In other words, nursing departments 
that provide “make-to-order” services will experience more operational failures if their supply 
departments “supply-to-stock” rather than “supply-to-order.” Operational failures will also be lower 
if key knowledge related to supply usage is translated across departmental boundaries.  Research on 
internal integration has found that having a person responsible for managing the internal supply 
chain is associated with better performance (Iansiti and Clark 1994, Pagell 2004). Our research 
suggests that this may be because that person can design supply and maintenance processes that 
enable materials to flow efficiently and reliably from the start of the chain to the patients’ bedside. 
Operational failures are more likely to occur on units with greater variability in the materials and 
equipment needed by patients.  In hospital settings, such conditions are found on units with short 
patient stays and a wide range of patient diagnoses, such as medical/surgical units. We thus propose 
that higher levels of integration will be more helpful in reducing failures on medical/surgical units 
than on specialized, long-term care units, such as bone marrow transplant units (proposition 6).   20 
 
Finally, proposition 7 states that hospitals that have mechanisms to foster process improvement, 
such as internal supply chain level measures of performance and regular cross functional meetings, 
will have lower rates of operational failures.  
6.  Discussion 
With an objective of shedding light on how hospitals can use operations management principles to 
improve performance, we examined organizational factors that contributed to operational failures in 
medical/surgical units at two hospitals. We found a wide range of causes, thus calling into question 
the general applicability of the “80/20 rule” to guide solution efforts.  Just over a third of the 
operational failures that we observed could be categorized as violations of Spear and Bowen’s (1999) 
work design rules related to activities, connections, and pathways.  However, SB’s rules were 
insufficient at fully explaining the causes of the operational failures.  A third of the causes were 
related to basic work needs not being met.  Another quarter stemmed from a lack of integration in 
the ISC, both with other departments and with current patients’ needs.  The final 12% of the causes 
were due to a lack of improvement efforts to prevent recurring operational failures. Another 
implication of our findings is that operational failures in hospitals result from work processes that 
are low on lean design principles and integration rather than from the reasons hypothesized by the 
employees we interviewed. These reasons, which included human error and a lack of training in 
other departments, collectively contributed to only 14% of the failures. Thus, to reduce operational 
failures, hospital managers need to address a wide variety of issues, such as ensuring that employees 
have the basic infrastructure needed to do their work; and redesigning ISCs to adhere to SB’s design 
rules, be responsive to end-customers’ needs, and enable effective handoffs of materials.   
6.1. Implications for Research 
Our research joins the stream of operations-based literature examining the impact of operational 
routines on performance in service organizations.  Similar to Pagell’s (2004) study of ISC integration, 
we highlight the importance of cross-departmental coordination and measurement. However, as 21 
 
Fredendall (2009) points out, not all of Pagell’s framework is applicable to a hospital setting, because 
clinical licensing requirements make it difficult to use job rotation and cross-functional teams to 
drive communication across departments.  Our study highlights the importance of process design 
and integration as mechanisms for smooth equipment handoffs between departments.   
We find that operational failures can occur if the work of supply departments is not directly 
connected to patients’ needs, even if those employees correctly follow their department’s 
standardized work routines. Thus we find that standardized routines are not enough, in and of 
themselves, to prevent operational failures.  Routines across departments need to be connected both 
with one another and with patients’ needs, and there needs to be unambiguous assignment of 
responsibility for material and information processing.  Furthermore, deliberate knowledge transfer 
across department boundaries is of key importance (Carlile 2002, Carlile 2004, Kellogg et al. 2006, 
Malone and Crowston 1990, Orlikowski 2002).  Prior research has identified knowledge transfer 
challenges in new product development teams (Carlile 2002, Iansiti and Clark 1994) and custom 
production of manufacturing equipment (Bechky 2003), but to our knowledge there is little research 
on knowledge transfer problems in the routine work of service organizations, which is a 
contribution that we make. Similarly, Gittell (2000) has researched coordination among clinical 
disciplines, which although important, is an incomplete assessment because it does not consider the 
interaction between non-clinical departments and clinical workers.  Thus, our work extends Gittell’s 
(2000, 2002) by examining coordination among non-clinical support departments and nursing units. 
With regard to measures, shared goals—a key part of the relational coordination literature (Gittell 
2002, Gittell et al. 2000)—are helpful in aligning conflicting objectives between different, yet 
interdependent departments (Pagell 2004).  We find that a lack of ISC-level measures of 
performance hinder performance, much like misaligned incentives can reduce a supply chain’s 
performance (Lee 2004, Narayanan and Raman 2004).    
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Our study offers lessons for managers of service organizations.  Workarounds occurred at the 
interface between a supply department that used predetermined “routines” (Adler 1995) to drive its 
work tasks and a patient-facing department that used “practice” (Faraj 2006) for customized patient 
care.  We observed that supply departments insulated themselves from variability in patient demand 
by stocking equipment and supplies on a fixed schedule independent of current patients’ needs.  In 
contrast, because of the high level of uncertainty in patients’ conditions, nurses had to use 
practice—an unfolding set of tasks that emerge in real time—to achieve their goals (Faraj 2006).  To 
avoid workarounds or the need to keep large stocks of materials on the units, managers should 
create a method for customer-facing employees to request and receive patient-specific supplies in a 
timely fashion.  One example would be for a supply department to assign a customer-support 
person to frequently restock the unit. Although this seems expensive, it can increase organizational 
efficiency by avoiding stock outs and reducing hoarding of supplies.  We believe that the ever 
increasing breadth and price of supplies in combination with limited storage space and funds 
available to nursing units make frequent restocking a more feasible long-term solution than 
increasing the quantities of supplies stocked on units.    
In addition, managers need to create an organizational focus on ISC-level design and 
performance.  Employees are unlikely to recognize systemic causes of workarounds, because they 
often blame poor performance on other people’s shortcomings rather than on poor work-system 
design (Institute of Medicine 2001). Similarly, uninformed managers might not recognize the need 
for a system-level focus, because their hard-working employees are executing required tasks 
successfully and meeting within-department goals. Unfortunately, such false feedback mechanisms 
can mask poor system-level performance.  Our research builds on the findings of other operations 
management studies that managers’ uninformed intuition about work systems can lead to 
suboptimal decisions (White et al. 2011).  In addition, our paper contributes to the body of 
operations management lessons for white-collar work (Hopp et al. 2009, Hyer et al. 2009).   23 
 
6.3.  Limitations and Future Research 
Our study has several limitations. First, we use qualitative data to draw descriptive conclusions, 
limiting our ability to test relationships among constructs and performance measures. The 
development of measures of integration with patient needs would enable researchers to test 
hypotheses related to our findings. Another limitation is that we were unable to do deep 
investigations of the underlying root causes of all of the operational failures.  Future studies could 
examine fewer failures, but in more depth to provide additional insight into causal factors. 
Furthermore, we collected data from four units in two hospitals, limiting generalizability. Examining 
more hospitals, as well as other service industries, would strengthen the applicability of our findings.  
An important question for future research is what steps organizations can take to improve 
integration of their ISCs. A logical extension would be the development and testing of interventions 
to improve integration. By testing whether various interventions have the anticipated positive impact 
on performance measures, researchers could more accurately gauge the value of specific practices to 
create more integrated environments.  Finally, we leave it to future research to test whether 
workarounds occur more frequently at interfaces between routine-driven and practice-driven 
departments than at interfaces where both departments’ work is driven by customers’ needs.   
6.4. Conclusions 
The design and operation of ISCs are important drivers of efficiency, job satisfaction, and quality, 
but are understudied in service organizations. By better leveraging the competencies of the different 
communities of practices responsible for delivering customer service, organizations can reduce 
operational failures, freeing up employees’ time to provide service.  Reducing operational failures 
will require an explicit emphasis on integrating the routines of the different departments within 
organizations to meet the needs of end customers.  
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Figure 1. Internal Supply Chain for Medications in the Two Hospitals. 
The larger arrows depict that the nurse gathers supplies from the nursing unit, as well as medications from the 
medication storage areas on the unit, to administer the medications to the patient. 
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Figure 2. An Example of Data Analysis:  Grouping Data Related to Searching for Equipment 
 
Figure 3. Model of Organizational Factors Associated with Operational Failures and Propositions for Future Research 
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Table 1.  Details from Research Phase: Observations and Interviews 
   Observations  Interviews  Observations and Interviews 
Perspective Hosp.1 
Hosp. 
2  Total  
Total 
Hours  Hosp. 1 Hosp. 2 Total 
Total 
Hours 
Total No. of 
Observations and 
Interviews 
Total Hours of 
Observations and 
Interviews 
Physician 0 1 1 2 0  1  1  0.7  2 2.7 
Pharmacy 2 1 3 4 0  0  0  0  3 4.0 
RN 21  27  48 82.3 12  4  16  7.2  64 89.4 
Engineer 1  0 1 2 0  0  0  0  1 2.0 
Central 
supplies 1  0  1 2 0  0  0  0  1 2.0 
Nutrition 1 1 2 4 0  0  0  0  2 4.0 
CPED 1  1  2 4 0  1  1  0.3  3 4.3 
Biomed 1  1  2 2.7 0  0  0  0  2 2.7 
EVS 4  2  6 9.2 1  0  1  0.3  7 9.6 
IT 0  0  0 0 3  0  3  0.3  3 0.3 
Total 32  34  66 112.2 16  6  22  8.7  88 120.9 
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Table 2.  Categorization of Organizational Factors Associated with the 120 Operational Failures 
Category  Example Operational Failure  Number Pct. of total 
Basic Needs      
Space, equipment insufficient  Computers on wheels are plugged into only electrical outlets, which are in 
front of the sink area. Nurse has to push computers out of the way every 
time she washes her hands. (Two nurses observed, n=2) 
19 11% 
Equipment maintenance  Bed rail broke. Bar code scanner was not working.    18  11% 
IT software  Unit assistant unable to process patient’s admission because more than one 
physician was writing a discharge in IT system. 
5 3% 
Simultaneity of work  Nurse was documenting care of her patient when she was interrupted to help 
another nurse pull her patient up in bed. 
5 3% 
Insufficient training  The nurse did not know the weight requirement for patients to be included in 
a bariatric study. 
2 1% 
Total     49 29% 
Activity Specification      
Work not done, done incorrectly, or 
against policy 
Patient arrives on unit after lunch time and needs a lunch tray, but has no 
dietary order from physician for food. Nurse calls physician to request an 
order in the computer system. 
22 13% 
Conflicting orders  Patient requested she be authorized to purchase a hospital bed for when she 
was discharged home. Physician approved, but the medical equipment 
approver did not.  Nurse has to resolve the inconsistency. 
6 3.6% 
Poor work design/routine   Change in policy requires nurse to have patient sign the discharge 
instructions, then make a copy for the patient to keep. Photocopier is far 
from the patient room, resulting in inefficient process.  
3 1.7% 
Total   31 18% 
Connection Clarity      
No trigger to request work  The linen cart was out of pants (and none had been ordered).   8  5% 
Timing of connection (too slow, or 
request interrupts work) 
Nurse was interrupted by another nurse, who asked her a question while she 
was preparing medications, despite the fact that the nurse was wearing a ‘do 
not interrupt’ medication sash. 
8 5% 
Status or work request unknown or 
difficult to contact the supplier 
Nurse needed to contact the patient’s physician, but her pager number was 
not listed.  
3 2% 
Total   19 12% 
Pathway Simplification      
No designated storage locations   Had to look around for a flashlight because there is no designated storage 
location. 
10 6% 
Internal Integration      31 
 
Work not customized for end 
customer needs 
Patient’s medications require a triple pump, but there was no triple pump in 
the clean or dirty utility room. 
10 6% 
Transfer of knowledge between 
internal supplier and internal 
customer 
Nurse looked in four different locations for bags of IV medication.  She 
called the pharmacy, who confirmed delivery, but the nurse never found 
them. Due to the amount of Lidocaine in the IV bags, they were in the 
medication refrigerator, in compliance with a storage rule known to the 
pharmacy, but not to the nurse.  
13 8% 
Information Sharing: Lack of IT 
compatibility  
Nurse called the laboratory to tell them about a lab test, even though it was 
already in the main computer system; the laboratory is on a different IT 
system and cannot see the laboratory orders in the main system. 
2 1% 
Gap in the process of getting 
materials through the 
organization 
There are not enough functioning computers on the unit, they take a long 
time to reboot, and run out of batteries if not plugged, and there are few 
outlets on the unit. The nurse went to use a computer, but the display image 
had been rotated by 90 degrees by another nurse to prevent others from 
taking “her” computer.  
14 8% 
Total   39 23% 
Detect and Improve      
Improvement: No measures of 
overall system performance 
Scanners, which are maintained by the IT department, are not working, 
delaying medication administration by the nurses. 
8 5% 
Improvement: No meetings 
between ISC departments 
There were not enough working vital sign monitors.   12  7% 
Total   20 12% 
Grand total    168*  100% 
* Does not sum to 120 because some operational failures had multiple causes. 
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Table 3. Level of Integration of Departments’ Work Routines and Performance Metrics with Patient Needs 
Department  Nursing 
Environmental 
Services (EVS) 
Dietary  Pharmacy 
Sterile 
Processing 
Biomedical  Engineering Materials IT 
The degree to 
which their 
work is 
integrated to 
a specific pt. 
High  High to Moderate
High to 
Moderate 
High Low Low Low  Low  Low 
Measure of 
Timeliness 
% of ED 
patients 
transferred in 
2hours.  Time 
from written 
discharge until 
leaves 
Avg. time to 
clean a room, % 
rooms cleaned 
within time limit 
Completed 
within time 
limit 
Avg. time to 
verify an  
order 
None 
Time to 
respond to 
individual 
failure 
Timeliness to 
respond to 
repair request
None 
None 
given 
Measure of 
Quality 
Scheduled med. 
Admin. time 
versus actual. 
Falls, patient 
satisfaction 
Adherence to 
cleaning 
procedure, Pt 
satisfaction with 
cleaning 
Taste of food, 
Courtesy of 
employees 
Accuracy of 
order 
verification 
Documented 
complaints 
Internal customer 
satisfaction 
survey 
Repeat calls 
about the same 
issue 
Number 
of open 
orders to 
be filled 
None 
given 
Measure of 
Cost 
Dept. actual 
expenses vs. 
budgeted  
EVS labor 
expenses versus 
budget 
Cost of meals 
Inventory, 
equipment, 
labor costs 
None None  None 
Dept. 
expenses 
versus 
budgeted 
None 
given 
% of three 
measures at 
org. level 
(2/3) = 66.7%  33.30%  66.70%  0% 33.30%  33.30%  33.30%  0%  0% 
Italics= Measure of patient or internal customer satisfaction with department performance; normal font = Department-level measure 